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Abstract
Revelation policies in an electronic marketplace differ in terms of the level of competitive information
disseminated to participating sellers.  Since sellers who repeatedly compete against one another learn based
on the information revealed and alter their future bidding behavior, revelation policies affect welfare
parameters—consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare—of the market.  Although different
revelation policies are adopted in several traditional and Web-based marketplaces, prior work has not studied
the implications of these policies on the performance of a market.
In this paper, we study and compare a set of revelation policies using a computational marketplace.
Specifically, we study this in the context of a reverse-market where each seller’s decision problem of choosing
an optimal bid is modeled as an MDP (Markov decision process). Results and analysis presented in this paper
are based on market sessions executed using the computational marketplace.
The computational model, which employs a machine-learning technique proposed in this paper, ties the
simulation results to the model developed using the game-theoretic models. In addition to this, the
computational model allows us to relax assumptions of the game-theoretic models and study the problem under
a more realistic scenario. Insights gained from this paper will be useful in guiding the buyer in choosing the
appropriate policy.
Introduction
The motivation for this paper comes from a real-life electronic marketplace.  FreeMarkets (http://www.freemarkets.com), a
Web-based reverse marketplace, initiates market sessions or periods at the request of buyers. The marketplace includes
geographically distributed sellers that face uncertainty both about the number of competitors (referred to as market structure
uncertainty) and their opponents’ cost structure. Their ability to overcome these uncertainties is dependent on the market
transparency scheme, or the information revelation policy, a choice made by the buyer. 
An information revelation policy dictates the information about bids—winning bids, number of bidders, etc.—that are revealed
to geographically dispersed sellers at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of a market session. At one end of the spectrum
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1Other examples:  (1) A policy where only the rank information is provided to the sellers as feedback.   (2) A policy where all bids with names
are revealed.   (3) A policy where all bids with the names are revealed.  (4) A policy where the only feedback provided is whether the seller
won or lost the market session.
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of available policies, the buyer can choose to accept sealed bids and notify its decision to each seller individually. Under this
policy, no other competitive information is revealed to the sellers. At the other end, the buyer can choose a revelation policy that
allows sellers to observe all bids submitted by their opponents in real-time. Under this policy, all competitive information is
revealed. Over the course of multiple market sessions, the revelation policy affects what sellers learn, how they bid in the future,
and the overall performance of the market.  To our knowledge, this important problem—the impact of revelation policies on buyer
surplus—has not been studied in any prior work. This leaves little guidance for the buyer to choose the appropriate policy. 
To investigate the problem, we consider the following two of the many policies1 available to a buyer in reverse-markets hosted
by FreeMarkets. 
1. Complete Information Setting (CIS): At  the end of a reverse-auction, all quotes are revealed to all bidding sellers.
2. Incomplete Information Setting (IIS):  At the end of a reverse-auction, only the winner’s bid is revealed to all
bidding sellers. 
We chose to study these specific policies because they are commonly adopted in both traditional marketplaces and electronic
marketplaces (Thomas 1996). The impact of these policies is explained for each type of uncertainty while describing the problem
context in the next section.
As a first step, we began attacking the relevant subproblems game-theoretically.  Arora et al. (2002) analytically compare CIS
and IIS using a framework where identical sellers are uncertain only about their market structure. Based on the analysis, we found
that CIS is preferred by the buyer to IIS under market structure uncertainty.  However, the results were different in Kannan and
Krishnan (2003), which uses a framework where sellers are uncertain only about their opponent’s cost structure.  Under certain
conditions, CIS was found to be better than IIS and vice-versa.  In real-life marketplaces since both types of uncertainties exist,
the key question that arises is:  Which effect dominates the other when both types of uncertainties are considered together?
As we will argue later, combining both types of uncertainties—market structure uncertainty and cost structure uncertainty—
makes the comparison between CIS and IIS analytically intractable, forcing us to seek alternate methodologies. In light of this,
our present paper employs a computational model to study the effect of revelation policies in a framework where both types of
uncertainties can be combined.  Knowledge gained from this analysis are intended to guide the buyer in choosing the appropriate
policy.  Although our work is motivated by a real-world electronic marketplace hosted by FreeMarkets, results generated in this
paper are applicable to any reverse-market setting that can create these different information regimes.
Our paper is organized in the following manner. Following the problem context description in the next section, we review the
literature most relevant to this topic in Section 3. Following that, we motivate the need for a computational model and describe
the model itself.  Results from executing market sessions on the computational marketplace are presented.  In the final sectoin,
we present conclusions.
Problem Context
We begin this section by describing a typical reverse-marketplace for coal. Buyers sequentially arrive at the electronic reverse-
marketplace and initiate market sessions. For each market session convened at its request, the buyer has the liberty of choosing
its desired revelation policy. On the seller side, there are a certain number of geographically distributed sellers who can offer coal.
Only a subset of them bid in each market session. For example, in each auction conducted by FreeMarkets, a maximum of three
or four coal sellers participate. Exogenous factors such as the type of coal the buyer wants or the distance between the coal mine
and the buyer site limit seller participation. Participating sellers are unaware of their market structure (number of competitors)
and cost structure, which they learn about across market sessions. At the beginning of a market session, each participating seller
submits a multidimensional bid which includes coal content, ash content, and water content of its coal, and the price quote. After
reviewing all bids, the buyer chooses the best bid and awards the contract to the winner. At the end of the market session,
submitted bids are revealed according to the information revelation policy chosen by the buyer.
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2An exogenous participation probability value is assumed for simplicity. Typically, the market-maker sends invitations to sellers. The set of
sellers invited to participate may vary depending on what the incentives are for the market-maker. Incentives for some market-makers may be
aligned with consumer surplus (e.g., FreeMarkets). Other market-makers may have an incentive to maximize social welfare (e.g., marketplaces
such as Transora or ForestExpress, where the marketplace is owned by consortia of both buyers and sellers). After receiving the invitation, a
seller may choose to accept or reject the invitation. Its decision could be based on production capacity constraints, expected profits from
participation, etc.
3For example, when 2h = ½, sellers know that nature tosses a coin for each low-cost seller and allows that seller to participate only if the
outcome is heads. But sellers do not know if the outcome was heads or tails when nature tossed a coin to decide whether or not to permit one
of the low-cost opponents to participate in that market session.
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In our paper, we model the following three types of participants:  buyers, the broker (the market-maker), and sellers. The broker
acts as an intermediary for the marketplace with Nl number of low-cost sellers and Nh number of high-cost sellers. A low-cost
seller incurs cl = 0 marginal cost of production whereas a high-cost seller incurs an exogenous ch.  Only a subset of all of these
sellers bid in each market session. Participation is assumed to be a random process determined by an exogenous parameter, 2l or
2h.  2l is the exogenous participation probability2 for the low-cost type and 2h is that for the high-cost type. In this computational
marketplace, the task of deciding about seller participation is delegated to the broker. The broker samples a uniform distribution
for each seller for each market session and decides about the participation for that seller. Although sellers know the values of 2l
and 2h, the realized values of the participation probabilities are not known.3  In this manner, we capture the uncertainty faced by
each seller. At the end of this process, let there be M sellers participating in the market session.
Each participating seller, i, submits a price, pi 0 [0,100],  which is assumed to represent multiple attributes of the bid. The price
bid is dependent on the following:  the information revelation policy adopted in the marketplace, its belief about being a
monopolist, and its belief about being the only seller of its cost-type in the reverse-market. After receiving all bids, the buyer
chooses the lowest priced seller as the winner (ties are broken randomly) and awards the contract. 
While developing the product, the winner incurs a cost corresponding to its cost type. The built product is delivered to the buyer
who, in turn, remunerates the winner. This point corresponds to the end of one market session. At the end of this market session,
information about the bids submitted is revealed, according to the revelation policy adopted in the marketplace. The information
revealed allows sellers to learn about the nature of their competition for future market sessions. Table 1 describes CIS and
IIS policies in detail. The table also provides a descriptive explanation of the impact of these policies on each type of uncertainty.
Table 1.  Information Revealed Under Each Policy
Complete Information Setting (CIS) Incomplete Information Setting (IIS)
Beginning of a market
session 
Uncertain Uncertain 
At the end of a market
session 
All bids are revealed Only winner’s bid revealed.
Beginning of the next
market session
All sellers are aware of market structure • Losing seller is aware of the market
structure.
• Winner from the first market  session
continues to be uncertain. 
Impact on market
structure 
uncertainty 
• When no other price bid is observed,
seller learns that it is a monopolist
• Otherwise, it learns about its competitor
• When a seller loses, it learns about the
existence of competition.  
• But if it wins, it learns nothing about market
structure. 
Impact on cost structure 
uncertainty 
• When a price lower than ch is bid by an
opponent, a seller learns about the low-
cost opponent
• Otherwise, it is not sure; it could be that
the low-cost opponent faked 
• When a seller loses and  observes a price
lower than ch bid by the winner, it learns 
about the winner’s cost structure. If it
observes the winner’s bid price to be greater
than ch, it is not sure if any of its  opponents
is a low-cost type.
• But if it wins, it learns nothing about cost
structure. 
Greenwald et al./Computational Approach to Information Revelation Policies
4 .
2
2 2( (1 ) )
k
k k
ρ
+ −
=
5The only financial market that operates as a single-sided auction is the primary bond market (e.g., U.S. Treasury Bills). Even in the bond
markets, the standard policy is to reveal the winner’s bid and the quantity.
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A similar process is repeated when the next buyer initiates a new market session. The key difference between the first and the
second market sessions is that with a certain exogenous probability k, the same set of sellers that participated in the first market
session bid in the second market session also. With a probability of 1 – k, a new set of sellers bid in the second market session.
The value of k determines participation correlation across market sessions, D.4 When D = 0, each market session is entirely
independent of the other and there is no value for the sellers to learn across market sessions.  But when D = 1, the value from
learning about the competitive nature is very high. Anecdotal evidence from FreeMarkets suggest that D is neither 0 nor 1 but
somewhere in between. We intend to study the impact of these revelation policies for different values of D by controlling k. 
The reverse-auction process is iterated T times, i.e., we simulate the arrival of T buyers to the e-marketplace. We are interested
in studying the impact of varying T on the expected prices paid by each of the T buyers. As noted by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2001),
analyzing the impact of the number of periods is important in a multi-period game (or a multi-period reverse-auction setting). The
impacts of parameters D and T are studied by using the computational marketplace described later.  The need for such a
computational model is explained after we review the relevant literature. 
Literature Review
Revelation policies in financial markets are referred to as trade-transparencies by the market micro-structure literature.  Depending
on whether information about outstanding orders or completed orders is revealed, these policies are respectively called pre-trade
transparency or post-trade transparency.  Information revealed under these transparency schemes include details of the limit order
such as the number of securities purchased or sought and price.  A number of papers have studied the impact of these trade
transparencies (e.g., Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999; Flood et al. 1999; Madhavan et al. forthcoming).  In the interest of space, we
skip the details of these papers, but focus on structural differences between electronic reverse-markets and financial markets.
Typically, financial exchanges are double-sided auctions5 whereas electronic reverse-markets are single-sided auctions.
Information revealed in a double-sided auction not only affects the behavior of sellers but also that of buyers. In a single-sided
reverse-auction, information revealed affects the behavior of sellers only. These differences make revelation-policy-comparisons
in our procurement e-marketplace context different from that in financial markets. 
To our knowledge, revelation policies in single-sided auctions have been studied only by Arora et al. (2002), Kannan and
Krishnan (2003), Koppius and van Heck (2003), and Thomas (1996).  Thomas compares CIS and IIS in a framework with two
sellers, where each seller is certain about the presence of its opponent but uncertain about its opponents’ cost structure. The model
assumes that each seller faces an opponent that is a high-cost type with a probability of ½.  Using this, he demonstrates that
CIS generates higher savings for the buyer than IIS. This model is further generalized in Kannan and Krishnan, which is discussed
in the next section. 
Koppius and van Heck use experimental data to compare revelation policies on bidders’ profits in a multi-attribute auction setting.
They show that the setting that creates the least level of uncertainty for bidders generates the highest profit for them. In their paper,
bidders face the following types of uncertainties:  uncertainty about the valuation that the buyer places on each attribute and
uncertainty about their opponents’ cost structure. Our paper is different from both Koppius and van Heck and Thomas in its focus.
In our present paper, we study the effect of information revelation policies in a framework where sellers face uncertainty both
about the market structure as well as opponent’s cost structure. Arora et al. and Kannan and Krishnan are reviewed in detail while
motivating the computational model.
Need for a Computational Model
Recall that Arora et al. (2002) deal with the effect of revelation policies under just the market-structure uncertainty while Kannan
and Krishnan (2003) deal with the same issue but under cost-structure uncertainty.  Both papers employ two-period game-theoretic
Greenwald et al./Computational Approach to Information Revelation Policies
6Outcome of the coin toss is described in footnote 3.
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models. In the model, each reverse-auction period is initiated by a buyer arriving at the e-marketplace. Participating sellers
simultaneously bid prices and the lowest price wins. For the simplicity of the analytical model, it is assumed that the same set of
sellers participate in both periods, i.e., participation is perfectly correlated across market sessions. The model in Arora et al.
corresponds to the setting T = 2, k = 1, Nl = 2, and Nh = 0  and the model in Kannan and Krishnan corresponds to T = 2, k = 1, and
Nl = 2.  Using these models, the expected prices paid by the buyer in CIS and IIS are compared. 
Under the framework with just market structure uncertainty, we demonstrate that CIS generates higher savings for the buyer than
IIS. The intuition for this result is as follows. Since only the winner’s bid is revealed at the end of the first period in IIS, the
information asymmetry disfavors the first-period winner in the second period game. In order to avoid this uncertainty in the second
period, sellers are willing to lose the first period. They do so by bidding a higher first period price, thus leading to a higher
expected price paid by the buyer in IIS than in CIS. In contrast to this, the comparison under cost-structure uncertainty, which
is executed numerically, demonstrates that IIS is better than CIS under certain conditions and vice-versa. Since all bids are
revealed in CIS, low-cost sellers may have an incentive to fake their cost structure under certain conditions. This faking behavior
leads to a higher expected price paid by the buyer in CIS than in IIS. 
Note that the game-theoretic framework under the cost-structure uncertainty framework involves no uncertainty about market-
structure, i.e., a known fixed number of sellers are assumed to participate.  Even in this setting the analysis is analytically
intractable, forcing us to execute numerical comparisons. When uncertainty about the number of sellers is also introduced into
the framework (which is our final goal), the equilibrium computations become complex thus, making a case for the computational
model (Kannan and Krishnan 2003). Additionally, in the computational approach, one can relax the following restrictive
assumptions that a game-theoretic model requires: 
• The number of periods:  Only a two period game is studied in game-theoretic models. In reality, buyers arrive at the reverse-
auction sequentially, initiating each period. So, the game is a multi-period game. 
• Participation correlation:  Participation correlation across the two periods was assumed to be unity in the game-theoretic
models. Stated differently, the same set of sellers that participated in the first period are assumed to continue in future periods.
Based on the anecdotal evidence from FreeMarkets, we find that, although the correlation is high, it is not unity.
The computational model adopted in this paper is described next.
Computational Model
In this computational marketplace, software agents are used to mimic the broker, buyers, and sellers. From the problem context
description presented earlier, it is straightforward to design software agents that mimic the behavior of buyers and the broker. But
the optimal bidding behavior of sellers is unknown and so, instead of modeling the bidding behavior, we provide a framework
for the “seller-agents” to learn. 
Learning Model
The task for any seller, i, is to choose an optimal bid and, based on the outcome of the bid, learn to bid in future market sessions.
For this decision problem, if we know the relationships between the different parameters, we can employ naïve learning models
such as regression, ID3, and KNN (k-nearest neighbor) and allow the sellers to learn the weights for the decision variables.  In
our case, however, the model cannot be completely specified and so there is a need for a model-free approach, e.g., Markov
decision process (MDP) and partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). 
The factors (or states of the Markov model) that drive the bidding behavior in our model are the realized probability value6 of
being a monopolist, the realized probability value of being the only seller of its cost type, and the current period (one of the T
periods).  By design, these states are unobservable and the framework corresponds to a POMDP model (Kaelbling et al. 1996).
However, the learning techniques for POMDP are still in the preliminary stages of research and, therefore, we mold this process
as an MDP. 
Greenwald et al./Computational Approach to Information Revelation Policies
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The state space for our POMDP framework are belief about being the only seller of its own cost type (discretized for finiteness
of the state space), belief about being the only seller in the market (discretized for the finiteness of the state space), the current
period ( one of the T periods), and, finally, whether or not it acted like a low-cost type by bidding a price lower than ch, the high-
cost type’s cost, in the earlier period. The last dimension accounts for the knowledge gained by the seller while it fakes its cost-
structure. The action chosen by the seller—the price bid— affects how the state space transitions.  If the price bid is pi and the
state space transitions from S to S', the reward (profit or loss) function is 
(1)
if wins
0 if loses
i i ip
S S
p c i
R
i′→
−
= 
In our model, sellers can bid discrete prices only, i.e., pi , {10,20…,100].  The optimization model used by the seller, given that
the seller is in state S, is
(2)max ( )
i
ip
Q S p,
where 
(3)
'
( ) max ( ' )i
i
p
i S S S S ipS
Q S p R Q S p
′ ′→ →
′
 
′, = Ω + ,  ∑
 is the transition probability from state S to S'  that the environment controls. The beliefs which are a component of theS S ′→Ω
state-space are computed by each seller based on the observation. If bmono represents the belief held by a low-cost seller about
being a monopolist, bcost  represents the belief held by the same seller about being the only low-cost seller in the reverse-market,
and M represents the number of market sessions in which it participated, then beliefs are computed by that seller in the following
manner: 
• Independent of CIS or IIS, if it is the first market session or if the seller participates in a particular market session but did not
participate in the previous market session, then 
(4)( 1) ( 1)(1 ) (1 )l hN Nmono l hb θ θ− −= − −
(5)( 1)(1 ) lNcost lb θ −= −
• Among all the bid prices revealed in CIS, let pj be the lowest bid in the reverse-market excluding its own bid. 
• if  j hp c<
(6)0monob =
(7)0costb =
• if  j hp c>
(8)( 1) ( 1)(1 ) (1 ) (1 )l hN Nmono l h
hi
Mb k k
M
θ θ− −  = − − − +  
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(9)( 1)(1 ) (1 )lNcost l
hi
Mb k k
M
θ −  = − − +  
where Mhi is the number of previous market sessions, the seller observed a price pj > ch.
• But if the seller did not observe any other bid in the reverse-market, then 
(10)( 1) ( 1)(1 ) (1 ) (1 )l hN Nmono l hb k kθ θ− −= − − − +
(11)( 1)(1 ) (1 )lNcost lb k kθ −= − − +
• In IIS, let pj be the best price bid that is revealed to all sellers and pi be the bid submitted by that particular seller. 
• If that seller won the market session, then pj = pi, then,
(12)( 1) ( 1)(1 ) (1 ) (1 )l h
i
N N
mono l h
p
Mb k k
W
θ θ− −
 
= − − − +   
(13)( 1)(1 ) (1 )l
i
N
cost l
p
Mb k k
W
θ −
 
= − − +   
where  is the number of previous market sessions, the seller won by bidding pj. jpW
• If it lost the market session and pj < ch, then 
(14)0monob =
(15)0costb =
• If it lost the market session but observes pj > ch, then 
(16)( 1) ( 1)(1 ) (1 ) (1 )l h
i
N N
mono l h
p
Mb k k
L
θ θ− −
 
= − − − +   
(17)( 1)(1 ) (1 )l
i
N
cost l
p
Mb k k
L
θ −
 
= − − +   
where  is the number of previous market sessions the seller lost by bidding  pi.ipL
In a similar manner, each high-cost seller computes its beliefs. 
In this framework, the recursive optimization function in equation 2 can be solved analytically if the expression for the transition
probabilities, , is known. In fact, one can derive the expression for  for D = 1 and T = 2 when each type ofS S ′→Ω S S ′→Ω
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uncertainty—uncertainty about market structure or uncertainty about their opponents’ cost structure—is considered separately.
Such solutions correspond to the game-theoretic models of Arora et al. (2002) and Kannan and Krishnan (2003). 
For different values of D or T or when both types of uncertainties are combined, however, computing transition probabilities
become analytically intractable.  In such a case, reinforcement-learning algorithms similar to those described in Sutton and Barto
(1998) need to be used for solving the recursive equation. The only constraint that the learning algorithm has is that it should be
able to identify mixed-strategy equilibria. This is important because results from Arora et al. and Kannan and Krishnan, although
for a specific setting, indicate the existence of such mixed strategy equilibria in this framework (in the interest of space, the
functional form of the equilibria are not shown).  Standard Q-learning algorithm fails to identify them well. In contrast, a variant
of the Q-learning algorithm that we developed, ratio-Q (the algorithm is shown in Figure 1), performs very well. We compare
the closeness between the predicted distribution and the empirical bid distribution identified by sellers adopting the algorithm for
a specific setting.
Input:  Cost c; c = ch, if seller is high cost type.  Similarly c = 0, if low-cost type.  
Initialize Q(S, pi) = pi – cœSœpi; Stores Q-values 
Initialize N(S, pi) = 10œSœpi; Keeps track of the number of iterations 
Repeat (for each market session) 
Initialize S
Choose action pi from S using Ratio-Q policy 
Take action pi , observe R, S  
'
[ max( ( ', ' ) ( , ))]
( , ) ( , )
( , )
i
i i
p
i i
i
R c Q S p Q S p
Q S p Q S p
N S p
− + −
← +
N(S, pi) ² N(S, pi) + 1
S ² S'
Until End of Market sessions 
Ratio-Q policy:  Given state S
Qmin = min Q(S, p)œp 
Qmax = max Q(S, p)œp 
Choose action  pi with probability  
min
max min
min
max min
( , )
( , )
i
k
Q S p Q
Q Q
Q S p Q
Q Q
k
e
e
−
−
−
−∑
Figure 1.  Ratio-Q Algorithm
Specifically, we set Nl = 2, 2l = 0.35, Nh = 0, and T = 1 and  in our problem context description, i.e., we consider a single-period
game with two low-cost sellers where each seller is uncertain about the participation of its opponent. The probability that each
seller observes its opponent is the 2l . In this game, the bidding behavior of the sellers can be computed game-theoretically. The
equilibrium is a mixed strategy one, whose cumulative density function (cdf) is
(18)
(1 )( ) 1
(1 )
l
l
pF p
p
θ
θ
−
= −
−
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that ratio-Q performs significantly better than standard Q-learning.
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Figure 2. Comparing the Empirical Bid Distribution
of Sellers Using Q-Learning Algorithm and the
Predicted Distribution
Figure 3. Comparing the Empirical Bid Distribution
of Sellers Using Ratio-Q Algorithm and the
Predicted Distribution
To compare the closeness of the empirical bid distributions to the predicted distribution, we set up these parameters in our
computational marketplace and execute two sets of 100,000  market sessions. In the first set, the sellers were embedded with the
standard Q-learning algorithm. In the second set, sellers were embedded with the ratio-Q algorithm.  Figure 2 shows the empirical
bid distributions of sellers using Q-learning algorithm, and the predicted bid distribution from the game-theoretic model. Similarly,
Figure 3 shows the bid distribution for ratio-Q algorithm and the predicted result. The closeness of each distribution to the
predicted values is evaluated using a simple nonparametric test metric:  Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance. This distance
measure is about 0.35 between the empirical distribution with Q-learning algorithm and the predicted values. In contrast, the
distance measure is about 0.05 between the empirical distribution with ratio-Q and the predicted values. Observe that ratio-Q
performs significantly better than the standard Q-learning algorithm.7  We employ this ratio-Q algorithm in our computational
marketplace to execute market sessions. Results based on data collected from these market sessions are presented next.
Results
Recall that we are interested in understanding how the expected prices paid by the buyer in CIS and IIS are affected by variations
in D and T when each type of uncertainty is considered separately. Further, we are also interested in understanding how CIS and
IIS compare when both types of uncertainties are considered together. First, we present our hypotheses.  We then validate those
hypotheses using data collected from market sessions executed on our computational marketplace. 
Hypothesis
Participation correlation, D, is an important factor that determines how much sellers value learning across market sessions. The
value that sellers obtain from learning is the highest when D = 1 (i.e., the exact same set of sellers repeatedly participates across
market sessions). At the other extreme, when D = 0 (i.e., each market session is independent of the other), there is no value in
learning. We know that the expected price paid by the buyer in CIS is lower than in IIS when D = 1 under market-structure
uncertainty (Arora et al. 2002).  As D decreases, the value of learning decreases. This implies that sellers in IIS have lesser
incentives to increase their first period price in order to learn their market-structure. So, 
Hypothesis 1.  As correlation decreases, the performances of CIS and IIS will tend to be similar when sellers
face uncertainty about market structure. 
Greenwald et al./Computational Approach to Information Revelation Policies
8Based on personal communication with FreeMarkets Inc.
2003 — Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Information Systems 715
Similarly, results presented in Kannan and Krishnan (2003) are valid when uncertainty about opponents’ cost structure is
considered separately at D = 1.  For reasons similar to that presented in the previous hypothesis, we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 2.  When sellers face uncertainty about their opponents’ cost structure, the expected price paid by
the buyer in CIS and IIS will tend to be similar as correlation decreases. 
In multi-period games (reverse-auctions), the number of periods is an important factor dictating the bidding behavior (Engelbrecht-
Wiggans 2001).  Under market structure uncertainty, sellers in CIS learn about their market structure at the end of each market
session. Since their learning is independent of the outcome of the market session, their bidding behavior is not altered. But in IIS,
only the winner’s bid is revealed to all participating sellers, so the value that sellers obtain from losing initial market sessions is
higher as T increases and therefore, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 3.  When sellers face uncertainty about market-structure, the difference between the expected prices
paid by the buyer in IIS and CIS will increase as T increases. 
For similar reasons, we hypothesize a similar behavior under cost uncertainty. 
Hypothesis 4.  When sellers face uncertainty about their opponents’ cost-structure, the difference between the
expected prices paid by the buyer in IIS and CIS will increase as T increases. 
Now let us focus on combining both these types of uncertainties. It is interesting to observe whether or not CIS is better than IIS.
We hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 5.  When sellers face both types of uncertainties, the expected price paid by the buyer will be higher
in IIS than in CIS. 
The intuition for this result is that the expected price paid by the buyer is lower in CIS than in IIS (Arora et al. 2002) when market
structure uncertainty is considered separately. Under cost-structure uncertainty, the expected prices are higher in CIS than in
IIS but only for very high values of 2l (Kannan and Krishnan (2003).  So when combining both types of uncertainties, we expect
the effect of market structure uncertainty to override the effect of uncertainty about opponents’ cost structure. 
Hypothesis Validation
We intend to validate these hypotheses by using data collected from market sessions executed on the computational marketplace.
Parameters for this computational model are set to be similar to a coal reverse-marketplace. Typically, there are 12 to 15 sellers
who can provide coal and, out of these, 3 or 4 participate in each market session.8  We replicate this by setting Nl = 5,  Nh = 6,
2l = 0.3, 2h = 0.3, and ch  = 100 in our computational model.  When we deal with just market-structure uncertainty, participating
sellers are of the same type and no uncertainty about opponents’ cost is assumed to exist. Specifically, only the low-cost sellers
were assumed to participate. When we model uncertainty about opponents’ cost structure, it is assumed that the uncertainty about
the number of competitors does not exist and we retain the total number of competitors M = 10.  For each (D, T) pair, we simulated
200,000 executions on the computational marketplace and the results based on the data collected are summarized below. 
Testing Hypothesis 1
For this analysis, we set T =  2 and executed market sessions for different values of D.  Table 2 shows the variation of the expected
price paid by the buyer as D changes under market structure uncertainty. First, notice that the expected price paid by the buyer
is significantly (statistically significant at the 5 percent  level) higher in IIS than in CIS when D = 1.  This matches the result
demonstrated by Arora et al. (2002). Second, we observe that the difference between the expected prices of CIS and IIS decreases
with decreasing D as hypothesized.
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Table 2.  The Effect of Variation of D on the Expected Price Paid by the Buyer
When Sellers Are Uncertain About Their Market Structure
(Standard Deviation shown in parenthesis)
Complete Information
Setting (CIS)
Incomplete Information 
Setting (IIS) 
First Buyer Second  Buyer First Buyer Second Buyer 
D = 1.0 29.92 (0.16) 45.35 (0.21) 65.12 (0.17) 47.86 (0.28) 
D  = 0.75 30.12 (0.14) 40.66 (0.18) 57.35 (0.15) 42.29 (0.25) 
D = 0.5 30.03 (0.16) 37.26 (0.15) 48.92 (0.19) 38.06 (0.21) 
Testing Hypothesis 2
Similar to the earlier section, we set T = 2 and vary D. Table 3 shows the effect of variation of the expected price with D when
sellers face uncertainty about their opponents’ cost structure. Based on the results, we observe the following: First, notice that
the expected price paid by the buyer in CIS is higher than that in IIS (statistically significant at the 5 percent  level). Second, when
comparing Table 2 and Table 3 corresponding to  D = 1,  we observe that the expected price paid by the buyer in CIS under cost-
structure uncertainty is significantly higher (at the 5 percent level) than that market-structure uncertainty. This can be attributed
to low-cost sellers’ faking their cost structure and bidding as high-cost sellers and this serves to increase the expected price paid
by the buyer. Third, observe that hypothesis 2 is valid. Note that the difference in the expected prices paid by the buyer decreases
as D decreases. 
Table 3.  The Effect of Variation of D on the Expected Price Paid by the Buyer
When Sellers Face Uncertainty About Their Opponent’s Cost Structure
(Standard Deviation shown in parenthesis)
Complete Information
Setting (CIS)
Incomplete Information 
Setting (IIS) 
First Buyer Second Buyer First Buyer Second Buyer 
D = 1.0 61.62 (0.26) 48.75 (0.24) 63.27 (0.13) 46.01 (0.28) 
D  = 0.75 55.24 (0.27) 43.28 (0.21) 56.54 (0.14) 42.87 (0.27) 
D = 0.5 47.53 (0.15) 37.26 (0.22) 49.10 (0.13) 38.38 (0.27) 
Testing Hypothesis 3
For this analysis, we set  D  = 0.75 and vary T.  Table 4 shows the effect of T on the expected price paid by the buyer when sellers
are uncertain about their market structure. Observe that the difference between the expected price paid by the buyer increases with
T, thus, validating hypothesis 3. 
Table 4.  The Effect of Variation of T on the Expected Price Paid by Each Buyer
When Sellers Are Uncertain About Market Structure
Time First Buyer Second Buyer Third Buyer Fourth Buyer  
Complete 
Information 
Setting (CIS)
T = 2 30.12 (0.14) 40.66 (0.18)
T = 3 32.24 (0.28) 36.25 (0.32) 38.61 (0.22) 
T = 4 31.28 (0.32) 34.54 (0.29) 37.21 (0.31) 36.63 (0.27)  
Incomplete 
Information
Setting (IIS)
T = 2 57.35 (0.15) 42.29 (0.25)
T = 3 61.33 (0.32) 60.97 (0.42) 39.22 (0.31) 
T = 4 65.49 (0.43) 63.21 (0.39) 61.29 (0.25) 40.26 (0.37) 
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Testing Hypothesis 4
Similar to the earlier section, we set D = 0.75 and vary T.  Table 5 shows the effect of varying T on the expected price paid by the
buyer when sellers are uncertain about their opponents’ cost structure. Note that although we observe results as hypothesized, we
did not take into account the following observation:  as T increases, the value that the low-cost sellers obtain from faking their
cost-structure is also higher. Thus, we observe that the expected price paid by the first buyer in CIS increases with T, but the
increase in the expected price paid by the buyer in CIS is lower than that in IIS. 
Table 5. The Effect of Variation of T on the Expected Price Paid by Each Buyer
When Sellers Face Uncertainty About Their Opponents’ Cost Structure
Time First Buyer Second Buyer Third Buyer Fourth Buyer
Complete 
Information 
Setting (CIS)
55.24 (0.27) 43.28 (0.21)
57.62 (0.34) 51.82 (0.42) 41.71 (0.44) 
T = 4 59.02 (0.37) 54.27 (0.32) 48.67 (0.29) 38.67 (0.41) 
Incomplete
Information
Setting (IIS)
T = 2 56.54 (0.14) 42.87 (0.27)
T = 3 60.36 (0.32) 58.31 (0.34) 43.51 (0.39) 
T = 4 62.40 (0.35) 59.26 (0.38) 55.23 (0.27) 42.17 (0.41) 
Testing Hypothesis 5
Table 6 shows the variation of the expected prices paid by the buyer when sellers face both types of uncertainties. Based on this
result, we validate our hypothesis. The difference between IIS and CIS is statistically higher (at the 5 percent level) and the
difference increases with increasing T. This also implies that the effect of numbers uncertainty overrides the effect of faking
behavior.
Table 6.  The Effect of Variation of T on the Expected Price Paid by the Buyer
When Sellers Face Both Types of Uncertainty
Time First Buyer Second  Buyer Third Buyer  
Complete Information Setting (CIS)
T = 2 52.93 (0.22) 55.36 (0.31)
T = 3 54.29 (0.32) 50.26 (0.34) 51.74 (0.32) 
Incomplete Information Setting (IIS)
T = 2 59.04 (0.26) 58.97 (0.31)
T = 3 61.86 (0.34) 59.19 (0.39) 57.84 (0.36)  
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper addresses an important IT-enabled real-world problem. A buyer arriving at an electronic reverse-
marketplace needs guidance to choose the appropriate information revelation policy. In line with this motivation, our paper studies
the effect of information revelation policies using a framework that is closer to reality—where sellers face uncertainty about both
their market structure and their opponents’ cost-structure. Specifically, we compare the expected price paid by the buyer in
CIS and IIS, two of the many policies available to a buyer in a reverse-market hosted by FreeMarkets. 
We execute these comparisons computationally. Similar economic problems have been studied using computational models in
other contexts (e.g., Das et al. 2001; Kephart and Greenwald 2002).  Our set-up is unique in being very closely tied to the
analytical framework while at the same time providing opportunities to extend beyond the limitations of the analytical model.
As described earlier, the ratio-Q algorithm is able to identify the analytically optimal bidding behavior for each seller under the
same assumptions of the analytical model.  However, when extending the game-theoretic framework, i.e., when combining both
types of uncertainties or when relaxing the assumptions of the game-theoretic model, we are not aware of what the optimal bidding
behavior of the sellers would be.  Given that our machine learning algorithm traces the true optimal behavior under the
assumptions of the analytical model, we believe that it does so even when the assumptions are relaxed.  
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Using market sessions executed on the computational framework, we learned that the effect of numbers uncertainty dominates
the effect of faking.  In addition to this, our analysis provides valuable insights into how participation correlation across market
sessions affects the expected price paid by the buyer. For example, consider a reverse-marketplace for metal castings. There are
about 2,000 U.S.-based metal-casting suppliers registered with FreeMarkets.9  In a typical reverse-auction for metal castings, about
20 of them are invited to participate. The participation correlation across market sessions for these sellers is observed to be low.
In this case, our results suggest that sellers in CIS and IIS behave identically and the buyer will be indifferent between the two
settings. On the other hand, in a marketplace for coal, there are very few sellers and only a subset of them participate. The
correlation across market sessions is higher and suppliers value learning. In this case, the buyer is better off choosing CIS over
IIS. This example illustrates the applicability of our results. 
Summing up, the computational model described in our paper has provisions to combine both types of uncertainty, to alter the
time period or the participation correlation across market sessions. These were not feasible game-theoretically. In that sense, the
computational approach acts as a bridge between theoretical and experimental study, an important benefit as argued by Simon
(1990) and Geoffrion and Krishnan (2001).  However, the primary limitation of our computational model is our inability to
endogenize participation probability. This is because sellers attempting to learn by trying different prices cannot learn if the
change in outcome they observe—say the win or the loss—is due to the change in the bid price or due to the change in the
opponent’s participation probability.  We are interested in investigating this problem further as a part of the future work.  Other
possible extensions follow.
• Note that this paper compares only a few of the many policies facilitated in reverse-marketplaces. We intend to extend this
work to study other policies facilitated in electronic reverse-marketplaces.
• This framework exogenizes the participation decision but one can extend this model to study the effect of revelation policies
in a framework where sellers decide about their participation endogenously.
• Other factors such as reputation effects can also be studied.
• In addition to these extensions, we also intend to focus on ratio-Q algorithm and study its properties. 
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